contents

2  OVERVIEW

5  CHAPTER I
Juvenile Detention Reform: Why Does It Matter?

8  CHAPTER II
What Is the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative and How Does It Work?

10 CHAPTER III
How Widely Is the JDAI Model Being Replicated Nationwide, and Who Pays for It?

13 CHAPTER IV
What Have Participating JDAI Sites Achieved Through Detention Reform?

23 CHAPTER V
New Directions and Continuing Challenges for JDAI

34 CONCLUSION

36 ENDNOTES
Overview

In a 2009 report, *Two Decades of JDAI: From Demonstration Project to National Standard*, the Annie E. Casey Foundation reported that the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) was “on track to become the standard of practice for how local justice systems nationwide handle the critical front end of the juvenile court process.”

Four years later, this update report finds that JDAI’s pace of progress has only accelerated. The number of jurisdictions adopting the model has continued to climb year-after-year, and state governments are taking an increasingly central role in supporting effective JDAI replication. Participating sites continue to report impressive results in reducing reliance on detention of court-involved youth awaiting court hearings or pending placement to correctional programs, and they have done so while protecting public safety and safeguarding taxpayer dollars. Meanwhile, the Annie E. Casey Foundation has launched an ambitious new effort to expand JDAI beyond the detention phase of the juvenile court process to focus on reducing reliance on incarceration in longer-term juvenile corrections facilities.

In summary, the current report finds:

The JDAI model has proliferated with increasing speed since 2009 and now reaches over one-fourth of the total U.S. youth population. At the end of 2013, JDAI was operating in more than 250 counties nationwide — nearly double the number of sites that were active in 2009 — spread across 39 states and the District of Columbia. These jurisdictions are home to just under 10 million youth ages 10–17, 29 percent of the U.S. youth population. More than 10 million additional youth reside in states that have signed on as JDAI partners and have committed themselves to supporting local JDAI replication efforts.

Through JDAI, participating jurisdictions are sharply reducing reliance on detention. The most recent data available show that among local JDAI sites, which reported both current and pre-JDAI data, the total average daily detention population was 43 percent lower in 2011 than in the year before joining JDAI. Thirty-four percent of these reporting sites have reduced their average daily detention populations by more than half since entering JDAI. Also, the data show that participating jurisdictions admitted 59,000 fewer youth to detention in 2012 than in the year prior to launching JDAI, a drop of 39 percent.

While detention use has been declining nationwide, detention populations are falling far faster in JDAI sites than in non-JDAI jurisdictions. Data from the federal Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement show that after rising rapidly throughout the 1990s and then holding steady through 2006, the total number of youth detained nationwide fell 22 percent from 2006 to 2010. However, a detailed statistical analysis completed in 2012 by researchers at the University of California Berkeley Law School found that detention populations have fallen far more in participating JDAI sites (42 percent) than the statewide averages (17 percent).
JDAI is reducing detention populations in ways that protect or enhance public safety. JDAI sites utilize a variety of indicators to measure trends in overall juvenile offending rates. Regardless which indicator they use, virtually all sites (93 percent) show improvement on public safety outcomes since entering JDAI. The most recent data available (through 2011) find that the average improvement on these public safety measures has been 36 percent across all sites reporting.

JDAI sites have reduced detention among youth of color and are working intensively to reduce racial and ethnic disparities. Overall, the average daily population of youth of color has fallen by 40 percent across all JDAI sites nationwide, nearly the same decline seen for white youth, even though youth of color have risen significantly as a share of the total youth population. JDAI jurisdictions detained 2,268 fewer youth of color per day in 2011 than they did prior to beginning their JDAI programs. While the Foundation cannot report an overall reduction in racial and ethnic disparities across JDAI jurisdictions — youth of color are still detained at over three times the rate of white youth — the initiative is playing a pivotal role in mobilizing local leadership to take on the Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) challenge, and JDAI has emerged as an important laboratory for exploring new techniques and strategies to combat disproportionate treatment of minority youth in the justice system.

JDAI is generating substantial savings for taxpayers by enabling participating jurisdictions to avoid costs for the construction and operation of secure detention facilities. Fifty-six JDAI sites have closed detention units or whole facilities as a result of smaller detention populations, reducing their detention capacity by a combined total of 2,050 beds, which translates to an estimated cumulative savings of roughly $143.5 million per year. Also, JDAI has generated substantial taxpayer savings in a handful of other jurisdictions by eliminating the need for construction of new or expanded detention facilities.

JDAI jurisdictions are sharply reducing the number of youth they commit to state juvenile correctional facilities and other residential placements. Across all sites reporting, commitments to state custody were down by more than 5,250 in 2011 from the sites’ pre-JDAI levels, a decline of 43 percent. While commitments and correctional populations have also been falling nationwide in recent years, the University of California Berkeley’s 2012 evaluation report found that the drop in commitments has been larger in JDAI sites (down 40 percent) than statewide in the states where JDAI is operating (down 29 percent).

In addition to documenting the impact and accomplishments of JDAI sites nationwide, this report examines a number of new or expanded activities related to the initiative.

Increasingly, the Casey Foundation is focusing on working with state government leaders to expand states’ capacities to nurture and support JDAI replication. New Jersey, where JDAI has been spread to nearly every locality, was named JDAI’s first statewide model site in 2008. Since then, 10 other states have sent leadership teams to visit New Jersey, and several have begun making encouraging progress toward building the state-level expertise and infrastructure necessary to support effective and widespread implementation of the JDAI model.
In 2012, Casey expanded the focus of JDAI to the dispositional end of the juvenile justice system with the aim of decreasing reliance on juvenile incarceration nationwide and minimizing the use of training schools and other large-scale juvenile correctional facilities. As documented in the Foundation’s widely cited 2011 report, *No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration*, America’s heavy reliance on juvenile incarceration does not reduce future offending by youth; provides no overall benefit to public safety; wastes vast sums of taxpayer dollars; and exposes youth to alarming levels of violence and abuse. As part of this “deep end” focus, the Casey Foundation is working with selected states and local JDAI sites to reduce incarceration by embracing best-practice reforms and adopting home- and community-based alternatives to incarceration that cost far less than confinement and achieve better results. The Foundation is also developing a range of publications and toolkits to promote reduced reliance on juvenile incarceration nationwide.
Juvenile Detention Reform: Why Does It Matter?

Detention is a crucial early phase in the juvenile justice process, the point at which the courts decide whether to confine a young person pending their court hearing or while awaiting placement into a correctional or treatment facility rather than allowing the young person to remain at home or perhaps in an alternative supervision program.

Every year, an estimated 300,000 young people are admitted to detention facilities nationwide, and approximately 20,000 are held in detention on any given night. The typical stay in juvenile detention is brief — the average length of stay nationally is about 20 days, and many youth spend only a few nights in these locked facilities. Yet even a short stay in detention can have an outsized impact on the ultimate case outcomes for court-involved youth — with potentially profound and lifelong negative consequences.

A Ticket to the Deep End. A vast body of research finds that youth placed into pretrial detention are far more likely to be formally charged, found delinquent and committed to youth corrections facilities than similarly situated youngsters who are permitted to remain at home pending their court hearings.\(^1\) Also, African-American, Hispanic and American Indian youth are far more likely than their white counterparts to be detained, even after controlling for seriousness of offense, offending history and other factors.\(^2\) Simply put, detention often functions as a slippery slope into juvenile justice’s “deep end,” one that affects youth of color disproportionately.

Damaging Consequences. Research also shows that placement into locked detention can cause young people serious harm, both immediate and long term. Detention disrupts young people’s schooling and exacerbates the likelihood they will fail classes or drop out. Harsh conditions and invasive supervision inside detention facilities can exacerbate symptoms for youth with serious mental health problems or a history of trauma or abuse. Over the long term, youth who spend time in custody are less likely to complete high school,\(^3\) less likely to find employment,\(^4\) and more likely to suffer mental health problems than comparable youth who are not detained.\(^5\) Detained youth are also more likely to be rearrested,
adjudicated or convicted for new offenses, and incarcerated than youth who remain at home awaiting court or pending placement. For instance, a recent study of youth in Cook County, Illinois, found that youth sent to detention were 13 percent less likely to graduate high school and 22 percent more likely to end up in adult prison than comparable youth placed on home confinement or into an alternative supervision program.  

**High Costs.** Detention also represents a significant cost to taxpayers — roughly $1 billion per year nationwide. Though expenditures vary from region to region, the average detention center costs roughly $150 to $300 per day, the equivalent of $70,000 or more each year for each occupied detention bed. The average cost to build, finance and operate a single detention bed over its first 20 years is approximately $1.5 million per bed.

**In the 1990s, a National Detention Crisis**

In the early 1990s, as the Annie E. Casey Foundation began planning JDAI, the detention component of the juvenile justice systems in most jurisdictions was arbitrary, ineffective and discriminatory. Nationally, the average daily population in detention was rising at an unsustainable pace, more than doubling from 13,000 in 1985 to 28,000 by 1997. Though a run-up in youth offending in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a factor in this rise, it was not the primary cause. As shown in the chart below, juvenile crime rates began a steep decline in the mid-1990s, and now stand at the lowest levels in recent memory. However, for nearly a decade the nation’s detention rate did not follow suit.
Rapidly increasing populations led to serious and widespread overcrowding in the nation’s detention centers in the 1990s, jeopardizing the health and safety of detained youth (and custodial staff), and compromising educational and other services. In 1985, just 20 percent of detained youth nationwide were confined in overcrowded facilities; a decade later, 62 percent were in overcrowded facilities. This period also saw a dramatic worsening in the disproportionate representation of youth of color in detention. In 1985, 43 percent of juvenile detainees nationwide were youth of color. In the most recent national Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, conducted in October 2011, youth of color were 71 percent of the detained youth population.

As the Annie E. Casey Foundation was initiating JDAI in the 1990s, these alarming detention trends were progressing in most jurisdictions without any serious consideration from public officials. More than 70 percent of all detention cases in 1995 involved property or drug crimes, public order offenses, technical probation violations or status offenses. Just 29 percent of all cases involved any violence — and many of these were misdemeanor assault charges. Yet few jurisdictions systematically screened youth to ensure that detention was only used for those who posed genuine public safety risks, few invested heavily in detention alternative programs and few had procedures to expedite cases and minimize lengths of stay in detention.
What Is the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, and How Does It Work?

JDAI was developed to demonstrate that detention populations could be substantially and safely reduced. While JDAI’s efforts focused on the detention phase of the juvenile court process, Casey Foundation leaders also believed that detention reform would be a catalyst for other needed changes in juvenile justice. For example, by reducing the number of youth detained pending adjudication and disposition hearings, Casey leaders were confident that participating sites would commit fewer youth to correctional institutions. More broadly, the initiative’s designers believed that over time the collaborative and data-driven problem-solving approaches integral to JDAI would stimulate other changes essential to a smarter, fairer and more effective juvenile system.

JDAI was inspired by a successful detention reform effort in Broward County, Florida, which combined inter-agency collaboration, research, objective screening procedures, non-secure detention alternatives and faster case processing to reduce its detention population by 65 percent from 1987 to 1992. The reforms came without any sacrifice of public safety and saved taxpayers more than $5 million.

Building on the Broward model, the Casey Foundation devised a comprehensive detention reform model with eight core inter-related elements:

1 **Collaboration** between the local juvenile court, probation agency, prosecutors, defenders and other governmental entities, as well as community organizations, including a formal partnership to cooperatively plan, implement and assess detention reforms.

2 **Collection and utilization of data** to diagnose system problems and proclivities, assess the impact of various reforms and assure that decisions are grounded in hard facts rather than myths and anecdotes.

3 **Objective admissions screening** to identify which youth actually pose substantial public safety risks, which should be placed in alternative programs and which should simply be sent home.

4 **New or enhanced non-secure alternatives to detention** targeted to youth who would otherwise be locked up and, whenever possible, based in neighborhoods where detention cases are concentrated.

5 **Case processing reforms** that expedite the flow of cases through the system, reduce lengths of stay in custody, expand the availability of non-secure program slots and ensure that interventions with youth are timely and appropriate.

6 **New court policies and practices to deal with “special” detention cases**, such as violations of probation and failures to appear in court, that in many jurisdictions lead automatically to detention even for youth who pose minimal risks to public safety.
7 Persistent and determined attention to combating racial disparities, including careful study to identify and specific strategies to eliminate bias and ensure a level playing field for kids of color.

8 Intensive monitoring of conditions of confinement for youth in secure custody to ensure that detention facilities are safe and appropriate care is provided.

JDAI’s demonstration phase — commenced in 1992 — involved five pilot sites, each of which received extensive financial and technical support to implement a multifaceted reform strategy. Begun at the height of the nation’s alarm over youth crime, JDAI pilot sites faced significant political resistance and, predictably, achieved mixed results. However, two of the original sites — Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon, and Cook County (Chicago), Illinois — recorded significant successes, as did two of the initiative’s first replication sites, Santa Cruz County, California, and Bernalillo County, New Mexico.

As word of these successes spread, the Foundation began receiving inquiries from additional jurisdictions seeking support to replicate JDAI. Initially, the Foundation considered these requests on a case-by-case basis, accepting those sites that showed clear commitment to detention reform and capacity to implement the JDAI model with fidelity. To help the new sites, Casey built a training and technical support infrastructure including expert consultants, specialized training, publications and conferences. The Foundation also named Cook County, Multnomah County, Bernalillo County and Santa Cruz County as model sites to host tours and assist other jurisdictions in planning and implementing detention reforms.

By 2003, recognizing that it could not offer this support to every jurisdiction nationwide wishing to adopt JDAI and hoping to encourage states to actively support JDAI replication, the Foundation announced that — with rare exceptions — it would no longer accept applications from individual counties seeking to launch new JDAI efforts. Instead, it would provide a green light for replication only to cohorts of multiple sites wishing to initiate JDAI simultaneously within any given state. In 2008, Casey named New Jersey as the first statewide model jurisdiction, based on its success in supporting effective replication of JDAI throughout most jurisdictions in the Garden State.
How Widely Is the JDAI Model Being Replicated Nationwide, and Who Pays for It?

As shown in the chart below, the number of jurisdictions participating in JDAI has risen dramatically since 2002, and the already rapid pace of replication has actually accelerated in recent years. As of 2009, when the Annie E. Casey Foundation published its earlier JDAI progress report, 142 local jurisdictions in 25 states and the District of Columbia had active JDAI programs, and these active jurisdictions were home to 17 percent of the nation’s children. At the end of 2013, four years later, JDAI was active in more than 250 localities in 39 states plus the District of Columbia. Those counties are home to 9.8 million youth between the ages of 10 and 17, meaning that an estimated 29 percent of the total U.S. youth population resides in communities where JDAI is being implemented.

![JDAI Replication Over Time: Accelerating Progress](chart)

As illustrated in the map on page 11, JDAI is active throughout all regions of the country. It is also broadly dispersed among rural, suburban and urban locations. Of the 253 counties with active JDAI programs in December 2013, 241 are located within the 34 states plus the District of Columbia that have...
signed on as state-level JDAI partners with the goal of replicating JDAI statewide. Just over 20 million children ages 10–17 (60 percent of the nation’s youth population) reside in a state that has signed on as a JDAI partner or in a county that is implementing JDAI independently.

One key factor in the recent acceleration in JDAI replication has been a new partnership with the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Beginning in 2010, OJJDP provided $500,000 per year for three years to support technical assistance and training in new JDAI jurisdictions. These grants enabled the Foundation to support replication activity in seven additional states. A second factor in JDAI’s accelerated expansion has been the progress made in several states to scale up JDAI replication. (See Chapter V for a more detailed discussion regarding building state-level capacities to support JDAI replication.)

To become a JDAI site, interested jurisdictions must apply for participation, and the Foundation accepts only those sites that demonstrate a strong commitment to the project’s goals, agree to implement all elements of the model and mobilize a broad-based collaborative leadership team with the skills and resources required for success.

Unlike the initial JDAI pilot sites and some of the early replication sites, jurisdictions joining the initiative in recent years have received very modest financial support from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, primarily to defray the costs of travel for staff to participate in JDAI-sponsored training and technical assistance events. Participating jurisdictions do receive extensive support in the forms of technical assistance, training, conferences and publications.

The limited grant support from the Casey Foundation has not proved an impediment to success for participating jurisdictions, however. Rather, by reallocating funds previously spent on secure detention,
shifting the responsibilities of existing personnel and securing grant funds, JDAI sites have had little
difficulty raising the necessary funds to support their detention reform efforts.

As of late 2013, 94 sites had provided fiscal information for 2012. These jurisdictions reported leveraging
a total of $44 million to support JDAI-related programming and personnel in 2012, 10 percent more
than in 2010 but slightly less than in 2011. (If recent history is a guide, the final figures for 2012 may
increase as additional sites submit financial data.) As in past years, the primary sources of this funding
were: state government appropriations and federal grants ($25.5 million), county government funding
($17.3 million) newly appropriated or reallocated from savings realized by downsizing or closing deten-
tion facilities; and Foundation grants ($1.1 million).

MIRROR IMAGES: JDAI’S GROWTH AND NATIONAL DECLINE IN DETENTION UTILIZATION

As shown in the chart below, JDAI’s expansion over the past 15 to 20 years has very closely
tracked a corresponding decline in the number of delinquency cases detained nationwide and the
daily population in U.S. juvenile detention facilities.

Though the chart does not prove a causal connection between JDAI’s growth and national detention
trends, it does make plain that JDAI’s expansion has almost exactly mirrored a simultaneous
drop in detention utilization nationally. Given that participating JDAI jurisdictions are home to
nearly 30 percent of U.S. youth, there can be little doubt that JDAI has had a significant impact on
juvenile detention policies and practices nationwide.
What Have Participating JDAI Sites Achieved Through Detention Reform?

When it launched JDAI two decades ago, the Annie E. Casey Foundation had two goals in mind. First was to demonstrate that reforms in the detention phase of the juvenile court process could reduce reliance on confinement significantly with no adverse impact on public safety and no additional net cost to taxpayers. Second, the Foundation hoped that success in detention reform would serve as a catalyst for broader reforms throughout the juvenile justice system. For some time now, the evidence has been overwhelming that JDAI is achieving the first of these goals — safely and substantially reducing detention populations in an ever-expanding number of participating JDAI sites. Increasingly, evidence is mounting that JDAI is also spurring broader reforms in juvenile justice systems.

Smaller Detention Populations. The most recent complete data tabulation from participating sites shows that JDAI jurisdictions have achieved a cumulative reduction of 43 percent in average daily population. Specifically, the 112 sites reporting data had a combined average detention population of 7,426 in the year prior to each site joining JDAI. As of 2011, the average daily detention populations in these sites totaled 4,253, which translates to a combined reduction of 3,173 youth per day in their average detention populations. Of these 112 sites, 68 reported reductions of one-third or more in daily detention population, and 38 had reduced daily detention population by at least 50 percent. (See chart on page 14.)

The significance of these declines in detention population becomes clearer when participating sites are compared with jurisdictions that have not taken part in JDAI. In a recent national evaluation of JDAI, the Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy at the University of California Berkeley found that within 23 states where JDAI was operating prior to 2010, detention populations had fallen 2.5 times more in participating counties (down 42 percent) than in the states as a whole (17 percent).

7 Reductions in the detention populations in JDAI sites are a function of two factors: lower admissions (in virtually all sites) and shorter lengths of stay (in many sites). Taken together, the 112 sites reporting admissions data admitted 59,000 fewer youth to detention in 2012 than in the year prior to entering JDAI, a decrease of 39 percent. Of these 112 sites, 99 report a decrease in admissions since entering JDAI. Progress has been more modest in JDAI sites’ efforts to reduce lengths of stay for youth placed into detention. Across the nation, the 112 JDAI sites reporting baseline and 2011 data showed an overall 8 percent reduction in the average length of stay. This limited impact on length of stay is a natural byproduct of the juvenile court process and the JDAI model itself. Through their JDAI efforts, participating sites typically reduce the use of detention for low-level offenders (who have traditionally been admitted for very short periods), which tends to push up the average length of detention stays because the remaining detention cases tend to be more serious and take longer to adjudicate.
Reducing Correctional Commitments. In addition to the large reduction in daily detention populations, jurisdictions participating in JDAI have seen an equally steep decline in the number of youth they commit to state juvenile correctional facilities. Specifically, the 112 JDAI jurisdictions providing data committed 5,254 fewer youth in 2011 (12,321 vs. 7,067) than they did in the year prior to entering JDAI, a 43 percent decline. Overall, 94 of the 112 sites have reduced commitments since joining JDAI, including 39 sites with reductions of 50 percent or more, and only 13 sites have increased commitments. (Five sites have seen no change in commitments.)

Juvenile correctional confinement has been falling nationwide in recent years, driven in part by dramatic reductions in several states (such as Texas, California, Ohio and others) where scandals over abusive conditions of confinement have sparked historic reforms to limit the number of youth committed to state custody.
As of 2012, 38 JDAI sites had reduced their average daily populations (ADP) in detention by 50 percent or more from their pre-JDAI levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JURISDICTION</th>
<th>ADP PRIOR</th>
<th>ADP IN 2012</th>
<th>PERCENT CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OR</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIERCE COUNTY, WA</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHMOND COUNTY, VA</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK HAWK COUNTY, IA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAYTON COUNTY, GA</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIMA COUNTY, AZ</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONMOUTH COUNTY, NJ</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHNSON COUNTY, IN</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAMSEY COUNTY, MN</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSEX COUNTY, NJ</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPEWELL, VA</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLESEX COUNTY, MA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUFFOLK COUNTY, MA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KING COUNTY, WA</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HENNEPIN COUNTY, MN</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACKSON COUNTY (16th CIRCUIT), MO</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUDON COUNTY, VA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>-62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST. LOUIS CITY (22nd CIRCUIT), MO</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUPAGE COUNTY, IL (18th CIRCUIT)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTGOMERY COUNTY, AL</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETERSBURG, VA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOK COUNTY, IL</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENTURA COUNTY, CA</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMDEN COUNTY, NJ</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCER COUNTY, NJ</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIRGINIA BEACH, VA</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON COUNTY, AL</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORFOLK, VA</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAKOTA COUNTY, MN</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWPORT NEWS, VA</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUDSON COUNTY, NJ</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURLINGTON COUNTY, NJ</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>-54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERGEN COUNTY, NJ</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>-54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANTA CRUZ COUNTY, CA</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSEX COUNTY, MA</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL/EASTERN OR (CEOJJC)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSCALOOSA COUNTY, AL</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHOE COUNTY, NV</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yet there is no doubt that JDAI has also had a significant impact in reducing correctional confinement rates. First, by sharply lowering the number of youth detained, JDAI sites have made it far less likely that young people will be committed to state custody. Second, as an outgrowth of their JDAI efforts, most participating jurisdictions have adopted reforms (such as establishing new probation practices, improving community-based programming services, etc.) in other aspects of their juvenile systems that further decrease reliance on deep end confinement. Indeed, the University of California Berkeley’s 2012 JDAI evaluation report found that in states that have active JDAI sites, commitments have been falling faster in those sites (down 40 percent) than occur statewide (down 29 percent). In 15 of the 23 states examined, JDAI sites’ reduction in commitments outpaced the statewide average.
Given the extensive research showing that placement into pretrial detention dramatically increases the likelihood of commitment, JDAI’s added impact on reducing commitments should come as no surprise. However, JDAI sites’ reduced reliance on incarceration is more than a function of fewer youth being detained prior to court dates. Three additional dynamics have also helped reduce correctional placements in JDAI jurisdictions. First, a number of JDAI sites have reallocated funds saved through reduced reliance on detention to support new community-based treatment programs, including evidence-based therapy models that can reduce youths’ behavioral problems. These new programs also provide judges an alternative disposition for youth who might otherwise be sent to residential facilities. Second, JDAI has led many sites to substantially revise their approach to probation violations, crafting new response grids and restricting probation officers’ discretion to file probation violations and detain youth for rules violations. Nationwide, 14 percent of youth in committed custody in 2010 were confined for technical violations. Third, in many sites JDAI has fostered a significant shift in the values of local juvenile justice leaders, including a heightened focus on limiting the use of confinement. Judge Cheryl Shannon, who presides over juvenile cases in Dallas, Texas, recently described JDAI’s impact this way: “I’ve been here about 18 years so I know JDAI was a total cultural shift for the judiciary. I know that now I send people home that I wouldn’t have in the past.”

**Favorable Public Safety Results.** The reductions in detention population achieved by JDAI jurisdictions have not come at the expense of public safety. In fact, most participating JDAI sites report reductions in juvenile crime since implementing the initiative. Across the country, JDAI sites rely on different statistical indicators related to public safety. Common measures include: new intake cases in juvenile court, juvenile arrests, felony petitions in juvenile court or total petitions in juvenile court. However, virtually all JDAI sites (109 out of 112) with outcome data for 2011 reported pre-JDAI and recent figures (2012) on at least one indicator of juvenile crime. And the vast majority of these sites (98 of 109, or 90 percent) show safety outcomes improving through the period of JDAI participation. As illustrated in the chart on page 18, gains in public safety were realized regardless of the measure employed, with average improvements of 29 percent in sites measuring new intake cases in juvenile court, 33 percent in sites measuring juvenile arrests, 43 percent in sites measuring felony petitions in juvenile court and 45 percent in sites measuring total petitions in juvenile court.

In addition to tracking general measures of juvenile crime, many JDAI sites also track specific public safety outcomes related to their detention reform programming, such as the share of youth failing to appear in court as scheduled, and the share who are arrested for new offenses prior to their court dates. Despite releasing many more youth in the pretrial period or placing them in community-based supervision programs, virtually all of the 38 sites providing data report that a smaller share of youth failed to appear in court in 2012 than in the year prior to JDAI. Also, the average rearrest rate for youth placed in detention alternative programs or released pending their court dates showed a net decline in the 42 sites reporting data.
Because many factors affect the rates for juvenile arrests and referrals, and juvenile offending rates have fallen nationwide in recent years, it is not possible to attribute public safety improvements to JDAI or to demonstrate conclusively that JDAI reduces youth crime. Yet, the juvenile crime reductions witnessed in JDAI sites nationwide clearly demonstrate that aggressively pursuing detention reform — and sharply reducing the number of youth held in secure detention — is fully consistent with public safety.

**Making Better Use of Taxpayers’ Money.** In addition to safely reducing confinement of young people, JDAI is also benefiting taxpayers by enabling participating jurisdictions to avoid costs for the construction and operation of secure detention facilities. Instead, participating states and localities have been able to reinvest the resources in more productive programming, reduce budget deficits, or both. In the 2009 *Two Decades of JDAI* report, the Annie E. Casey Foundation reported that 27 JDAI sites across the country had closed detention units or whole facilities as a result of smaller detention populations, reducing their detention capacity by a combined total of 978 beds. As of 2013, those figures had grown to 2,050 beds reduced in 56 jurisdictions.

Unfortunately, no credible national estimate of the average daily cost of detention has been calculated in recent years, and available figures on daily costs vary widely from one jurisdiction to the next. An Internet scan of recently published detention cost estimates in seven states and localities ranged from $150 per day in South Carolina in 2006 (equivalent to $55,000 per year) to $652 per day in Cook County, Illinois, in 2013 (the equivalent of $238,000 per year). The median figure was $82,000 per year (Massachusetts, 2007). Using a conservative range of $60,000 to $80,000 per year, JDAI sites are realizing $123 million to $164 million each year in reduced costs for secure detention.
In addition to closing existing detention units, JDAI has also generated substantial taxpayer savings in a handful of other jurisdictions by eliminating the need for construction of new or expanded detention facilities. For example, Dakota County, Minnesota, was poised to approve $12 million for construction of a new detention facility in 2007. Instead, by entering JDAI the county cut its average daily detention population by more than half (from 35.5 in 2005 to 15.6 in 2011), averting the need for a new facility. On a grander scale, Cook County was able to scrap planned construction of a 200-bed facility in the late 1990s, saving Cook County taxpayers an estimated $250 million over 20 years.

The considerable reductions in spending on secure detention have benefited JDAI jurisdictions in two ways. First, the savings have helped participating states and localities ease the dire fiscal crises they have faced since the Great Recession emerged in 2009, limiting the need for cutbacks in essential programs and services. Second, leaders in many JDAI jurisdictions have reallocated some of the funds saved by decommissioning detention facility beds to fund promising new programs and services for court-involved and other at-risk youth. Most sites have significantly expanded their detention alternatives programming, and many have added staff specifically related to detention reform (such as site coordinators, case expediters and data specialists). But many sites have also used funds saved through detention bed closures to launch new programs aimed at improving their juvenile justice systems more broadly.

For instance, Bernalillo County has created a fully licensed mental health clinic for court-involved and other high-risk youth, including many participants in its detention alternatives programs. Harris County (Houston), Texas, has created a girls court to address the needs of girls in its juvenile system. Clark County (Las Vegas), Nevada, has funded community mental health treatment teams. And DuPage County, Illinois, has funded three therapists specially trained in Multisystemic Therapy, an intensive and family-focused treatment model that has proven more effective than residential placement and other common court sanctions in a long series of clinical evaluation trials dating back to the 1980s.

**Combating Racial Disparities.** Perhaps the most troubling feature of the juvenile justice system is the persistence of unequal treatment of youth from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Indeed, youth of color have comprised an ever-increasing percentage of the confined population since the 1980s. By 2011, the most recent year for which national data are available, 71 percent of all detainees were youth of color, far above their 43 percent share of the total U.S. youth population.

The wide disparities in the detention rates for youth of color vs. white youth cannot be explained by differences in offending rates. In the most comprehensive review of recent scientific research on the effects of race and ethnicity on juvenile case processing (completed in 2011), the vast majority of studies identified (63 of 79) found significant disparities in the treatment of youth at one or more of the decision points examined based on their race or ethnicity. The study also found that the disparities were most prevalent at the early stages of the juvenile court process, such as arrest, referral to juvenile court and detention.
In 2012, a National Academies of Science panel concluded that, “Despite a research and policy focus on this matter for more than two decades, remarkably little progress has been made on reducing the disparities themselves or in reaching scholarly consensus on the root source of these disparities. Volumes of data have been collected, but comparatively little progress has been made in addressing the problem.”

From the outset, the Foundation has made combating racial disparities a core element of the JDAI model, requiring a rigorous and explicit focus from participating sites and providing them with extensive training and support on DMC issues. Collectively, JDAI sites have not yet succeeded in reducing the overall disproportionality of their detention populations — on average youth of color residing in JDAI counties remain about three and a half times more likely to be detained than white youth. Yet, the vast majority of sites have substantially reduced the number of minority youth in detention. In 112 sites reporting, JDAI jurisdictions detained 2,268 fewer youth of color per day in 2011 than they did prior to beginning the detention reform process, a 40 percent decline. These reductions have occurred despite a significant increase in the youth of color share of population in JDAI sites. (As of 2012, the youth of color population in reporting sites has grown by over 300,000 [or 9 percent] since the sites entered JDAI, while the population of white non-Hispanic youth declined by more than 350,000 [or 10 percent].) Due to the higher detention rates of youth of color both nationwide and in JDAI sites, this demographic shift would have been expected to increase the detention populations in participating JDAI sites. Instead, the detained populations fell by 46 percent each for both youth of color and white youth compared with the levels that would have been expected by the demographic trends alone.

**Change in Average Daily Population (ADP) in JDAI Sites from Baseline to 2012 for Youth of Color and All Other Youth**

N=99 Sites from Which Complete ADP and YOC ADP Data Were Received and for Which Baseline and 2012 Population Data Could Be Obtained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-JDAI Baseline ADP</th>
<th>ADP Assuming Baseline Rates of Detention and 2012 Demographics</th>
<th>Reported 2012 ADP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth of Color</td>
<td>5,281.3</td>
<td>5,866.1</td>
<td>3,199.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Youth</td>
<td>1,647.8</td>
<td>1,458.7</td>
<td>787.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+11% -46%
HOW ARE JDAI SITES REDUCING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES?

• In 2006, two JDAI work groups in Pima County (Tucson), Arizona, began to explore why large numbers of county youth — the vast majority of them youth of color — were being detained on domestic violence charges. Specifically, data showed the Latino youth were 15 percent more likely than whites to be detained in Pima County on misdemeanor domestic violence charges, while American Indian youth were 47 percent more likely, and African-American youth were three times as likely. In 2007, the county opened a Domestic Violence Alternative Center (DVAC) to handle the cases of youth referred to court for misdemeanor domestic violence charges. In 2011, more than three-fourths of all misdemeanor domestic violence cases were referred directly to the new DVAC, and only 42 resulted in detention admissions — down from 415 in 2004.8

• Since creating a new DMC steering committee and collaborative in 2008 to dig deeply into the causes of racial disparities and identify possible remedies, the JDAI leadership team in Ramsey County (St. Paul), Minnesota, has changed several policies and practices that county data showed were affecting youth of color disproportionately. Specifically, Ramsey County has: eliminated a longstanding “waiver” option that allowed probation officers to detain youth for up to 48 hours without a judge’s approval; ended automatic detention of youth for failing to appear in court for low-risk youth; and created a graduated response grid to limit the number of youth detained for technical violations.

• Though Pierce County, Washington, reduced its overall detention population by more than half from 2003 to 2008 (from 147 to 65), African-American youth remained 4.5 times as likely to be detained as white youth. A statistical analysis found that many low- or medium-risk African-American youth were being admitted to detention as a result of failures to appear and other technical violations. After juvenile court staff began sending a case monitor to the home of any youth who could not be reached and reminded of the court date by telephone in 2008, the court appearance rate among youth of color shot up from 52 percent to 91 percent. The county also stopped filing probation violations automatically on youth who absconded from home or failed to remain in contact with their probation officers. Instead, Pierce County created a new continuum of responses, requiring detention only when youth are high risk or abscond repeatedly. In 2011, African-American youth spent 75 percent fewer days in detention due to these violations than they had in 2008, and the overall disparity in detention rates for African-American and white youth in Pierce County declined from 4.5:1 down to 3.4:1.12
Perhaps as significant as the statistical results achieved to date in reducing unnecessary confinement of youth of color has been JDAI’s impact in mobilizing local leadership to take on the DMC challenge with seriousness of purpose. According to a recent National Council on Crime and Delinquency survey of 90 active JDAI sites, nearly three-fourths have active subcommittees working to identify and address racial and ethnic disparities. Most sites routinely break down their detention data by race and ethnicity, and most sites report that local personnel have participated in DMC training from the W. Hayward Burns Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity, a national leader on the issue. Most sites reported that they have used data analyses to identify one or more practice or decision point where youth from a racial and ethnic group were being disadvantaged by the jurisdiction’s policies and practices.

Meanwhile, a growing number of sites have undertaken increasingly sophisticated and ambitious disparity reduction initiatives to identify policies and practices that inadvertently exacerbate racial and ethnic disparities. Through these efforts, sites have instituted reforms and abandoned or modified disparity-producing practices, thereby reducing the unnecessary incarceration of youth of color. In some of these cases, DMC reduction efforts have enabled sites to significantly reduce the overall disparity in the detention rates of white youth and youth of color.

According to James Bell, executive director of the Burns Institute, JDAI has served as a catalyst to spark serious attention to the DMC problem, and it remains a vital laboratory for innovation and experimentation in the search for effective responses to this vexing challenge.

“What JDAI has done is brought to scale this conversation in a way that without JDAI could never have happened,” Bell says. “If 10 people decide that they’re going to work on JDAI, that means there are 10 people who are supposed to engage in work around racial and ethnic disparities… Without JDAI, those 10 wouldn’t be there.

“Because they’re involved in JDAI, they have access to the Burns Institute, which they may not have had before,” adds Bell. “And so they have much more of an opportunity to go deeper.”
New Directions and Continuing Challenges for JDAI

In addition to advancing the core JDAI goals of safely reducing reliance on secure detention, combating racial and ethnic disparities, and improving conditions of confinement in juvenile detention centers, the Annie E. Casey Foundation and its allies have extended the JDAI agenda in several new directions in recent years. The most important of these new or heightened priorities have involved strengthening states’ commitment and capacity to support JDAI replication and expanding JDAI’s focus to the “deep end” of the juvenile justice system.

Empowering States to Bring JDAI to Scale

Among the most important lessons gleaned from two decades of experience with detention reform is that — on their own — jurisdictions need training and technical assistance to change old practices that lead to unnecessary or inappropriate use of detention. Despite the noteworthy accomplishments of initial JDAI sites in many states, replication has not flowed naturally across states. This may be for a variety of reasons. Local juvenile court and corrections personnel may not be well-informed about JDAI, for instance, or they may lack any means to compile or analyze data on detention utilization trends, a core ingredient of the JDAI approach. In many jurisdictions, local juvenile court systems lack any tradition of collaborative action to examine the overall effectiveness of their local justice system, or take unified action to improve system results.

If JDAI is to be available to all kids, courts and communities nationwide, more than 3,000 counties will need the kinds of support Casey has provided to the more than 250 currently participating counties. No foundation is positioned to support replication at that scale.

States, however, can provide crucial help to localities in overcoming the barriers to participation and success in JDAI. States can spark interest and build local momentum toward detention reform at the local level; provide direct support and guidance for local JDAI implementation efforts; and spread the word about detention reform and facilitate a new consensus in support of detention reform across a state’s many local jurisdictions. Unfortunately, time and experience have also shown that state leadership on detention reform — while potentially invaluable — has not emerged organically in most states. Detention is typically a local function, so few states have existing infrastructure to provide training and guidance on reform strategies. States, therefore, need help to mobilize support and provide meaningful leadership to promote widespread and successful JDAI replication.

The Casey Foundation has been working to engage states in the JDAI replication process for more than a decade. Since 2003, the Foundation has — with rare exceptions — provided a green light for replication only to cohorts of multiple sites wishing to initiate JDAI simultaneously within any given state. As
part of this cohort approach, the Foundation has required that each new replication effort include a state partner — a state agency committed to supporting the JDAI effort and capable of bringing together major stakeholders. These state partners can serve as the administrative hub for JDAI replication efforts statewide, and as grantees to receive Foundation funds and distribute them to local sites and others as determined by their state/local JDAI replication plans.

Between 2002 and 2005, multisite JDAI replication efforts were launched in Minnesota, New Jersey, Virginia and Washington State. Cohorts from 10 more states entered JDAI from 2006 to 2010, and many more have joined since 2010. In all of these states, the cohort approach has allowed Casey to maximize the impact of its investments in training and technical assistance for new sites, and to create a critical mass of activity in participating states. Initially, however, few states made significant progress in building a robust infrastructure to help local sites adopt and implement JDAI effectively, or in creating opportunities and incentives to encourage local jurisdictions to undertake JDAI. As a result, only a handful achieved substantial progress toward broader replication in remaining localities.

New Jersey was a striking exception to this trend. After starting with five sites in 2004, New Jersey extended its JDAI efforts to 10 sites beginning in 2006. And it has continued to gradually expand to additional sites ever since, adding its 17th county in 2013. With the four remaining counties slated to join JDAI by 2015, New Jersey has distinguished itself as the only state in the nation where JDAI is on track for statewide adoption in the near term. Both in the initial counties and in replication sites, detention admissions and daily population have plummeted. Many of the state’s detention centers have closed or consolidated. An impressive network of detention alternatives has been erected, and a new risk assessment instrument, widely embraced by judges and other system leaders throughout the state, has helped to sharply reduce the number of low-risk youth placed into detention cells. These reforms, in turn, have significantly reduced the number of youth committed to state custody.

These enviable results can be traced to critical assistance provided by New Jersey’s state government. From the outset of their JDAI efforts in 2004, top officials in New Jersey’s juvenile corrections agency and judiciary focused intently on statewide replication. Over time, led by an active statewide leadership collaborative, New Jersey developed a multifaceted support structure to facilitate effective JDAI replication, including: a network of detention specialists to support local JDAI efforts, a strong statewide data collection and analysis process, a clear and consistent process for counties to initiate local JDAI efforts, and periodic statewide JDAI conferences.
Based on its progress, New Jersey was named the JDAI initiative’s only state-level model site in 2008. Since then, the Casey Foundation has paid for leadership teams from 10 other states to make site visits to New Jersey, learn about its approach and use New Jersey’s progress as a launching point for discussions about how their states can take a more active and effective role in promoting successful replication.13

Through these visits, and through the ongoing support provided by Casey staff and consultants, a number of states have begun making encouraging progress in building the state-level expertise and infrastructure necessary to support widespread replication and take JDAI to scale.

**Indiana:** Soon after an 11-member leadership team visited New Jersey in May 2010, the Indiana Department of Corrections (which oversees the state’s youth corrections facilities), the Indiana Crime and Justice Institute, and the state Supreme Court agreed to partner in an ambitious JDAI expansion effort. In September 2010, the state formed a broader statewide JDAI steering committee, and a month later Indiana expanded JDAI from four to eight counties. Since then, the state has provided intensive support in the eight participating counties, which together are home to one-third of Indiana’s youth. For instance, the state organized training sessions on fundamentals of JDAI and other topics such as data utilization, facility inspections and conditions of confinement, and disproportionate minority confinement. It partnered with the Annie E. Casey Foundation to prepare a system assessment for each participating county, and it invited the Haywood Burns Institute to participate in an extensive engagement on disproportionate minority confinement in four local sites. Building on this progress, Indiana’s state legislature approved a $5.5 million appropriation in the spring of 2013 to support JDAI replication over the coming years.

### USE OF DETENTION IN NEW JERSEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRE-JDAI SITE Total / Average</th>
<th>POST-JDAI SITE Total / Average 2011</th>
<th>PRE-POST Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admission to Detention Facilities</td>
<td>10,191</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Population in Detention</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Population in Detention (Youth of Color)</td>
<td>8,854</td>
<td>3,651</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Youth Committed to Secure State Correctional Facilities</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>-61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Youth Committed — Youth of Color</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Admissions to Detention for Violations of Probation</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>-65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Juvenile Arrests</strong></td>
<td><strong>53,023</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,347</strong></td>
<td><strong>-33%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Arrests for Serious (Index) Crimes</td>
<td>10,327</td>
<td>8,090</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Juvenile Justice: Measuring Change in New Jersey’s Treatment of Young Offenders, KIDS COUNT Special Report, Advocates for Children of New Jersey, October 2012
two years. With the new funds, Indiana is providing financial support to local JDAI coordinators in all participating sites, and it has created a state-level team to work with JDAI counties across the state and support the expansion of JDAI over time. This team includes a state coordinator, four detention strategists and administrative support at the Indiana Judicial Center, plus an independent consultant to assist in data collection and analysis.

**Missouri:** In 2006, Missouri launched JDAI in four of the state’s five most populous localities: Jackson County (Kansas City), Greene County, the city of St. Louis and St. Louis County. Three more counties joined JDAI in 2008. A year later, Missouri’s Office of State Court Administration, Department of Public Safety and State Advisory Group for juvenile justice agreed to make JDAI expansion a top priority and began allocating a substantial share of Missouri’s federal juvenile justice funds for detention reform. Following a 2010 site visit to New Jersey, the state’s JDAI planning committee devised a clear process for new sites to join JDAI, launched JDAI replication efforts in eight additional jurisdictions and began providing start-up grants to new JDAI sites as well as grants to older sites to support new detention alternatives programming. Missouri’s Supreme Court approved a new rule requiring all juvenile courts statewide to utilize a standardized detention assessment instrument. As of this writing, 16 of the 19 judicial circuits in Missouri with detention centers have active JDAI initiatives.

In addition to Indiana and Missouri, eight other states have also sent delegations to visit New Jersey as part of their efforts to strengthen state-level support for JDAI replication. In these and other states, state-level JDAI leadership teams are ramping up their support for replication. Much work remains to be done, but building on this progress and expanding state-level support for detention reform remain top priorities for the Casey Foundation in its JDAI efforts.

**Expanding JDAI’s Focus to the Deep End of the Juvenile Justice System**

In October 2011, the Annie E. Casey Foundation published an authoritative report, *No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Reliance on Juvenile Incarceration*, which presented conclusive evidence to prove that wholesale incarceration of juvenile offenders is a failed strategy for combating youth crime. Based on decades of research, the study found that heavy reliance on juvenile incarceration:

- **Fails to reduce future offending by confined youth:** Within three years of release, the report found, roughly three-quarters of youth are rearrested, half or more are convicted of a new offense.

- **Provides no net benefit to public safety:** States that lowered juvenile confinement rates the most from 1997 to 2007 saw a greater decline in juvenile violent crime arrests than states that increased incarceration rates or reduced them more slowly.
Wastes taxpayers’ money: Nationwide, states continue to spend the bulk of their juvenile justice budgets — $5 billion in 2008 — to confine young offenders in incarceration facilities despite evidence showing that alternative in-home or community-based programs can deliver equal or better results for a fraction of the cost.

Exposes youth to high levels of violence and abuse: In nearly half of the states, persistent maltreatment has been documented since 2000 in at least one state-funded institution. Recent surveys find that one in 10 confined youth report being sexually abused by staff or other youth, and 42 percent fear physical attack.

The publication of *No Place for Kids* signaled the Casey Foundation’s decision to expand JDAI’s focus to reducing the number of youth committed to correctional institutions and other facilities, and encouraging states to abandon the large training school model of youth corrections. The first year of this effort, 2012, was dedicated to three primary tasks: (1) conceptualizing the core principles that will guide the new efforts to promote reforms in the deep end of the juvenile justice system; (2) developing tools and technical assistance materials to support deep end reform efforts, as well as other publications to boost public awareness of the need for reducing reliance on youth incarceration; and (3) identifying a limited number of states and local jurisdictions to participate as deep end pilot sites.

A Year of Planning and Preparation. Building on recommendations from the *No Place for Kids* report, the Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Justice Strategy Group identified six essential cross-cutting requirements for effective deep end reform (collaborative leadership, data-driven decision making, racial and ethnic equity, a focus on youth well-being, family engagement and effective legal representation) as well as six key decision points in the case processing continuum that can fuel (or prevent) unnecessary deep end placements. (See text box on page 28 for details.)

Based on these core concepts, the Casey Foundation began developing training materials, analytic tools and a web-based technical assistance hub to aid jurisdictions in reviewing their juvenile systems to identify opportunities for reducing confinement. These included: a best practices guide documenting strategies that sites might use to narrow the pipeline of cases in their systems, improve dispositional decision making and establish alternatives to incarceration; a quantitative guide instructing sites about data collection needs and analytic techniques they can use to better understand dispositional trends; and a system assessment framework to help sites diagnose weaknesses in current policies, practices and programs.
CORE ELEMENTS OF THE DEEP END INITIATIVE

To guide the work of states and local sites engaged in deep end reforms to limit the excessive reliance on incarceration and other residential placements, the Casey Foundation has identified two sets of core concepts. First is a set of six cross-cutting elements that represent the essential qualities of a reformed system. Second is a list of six key points in the case processing continuum that can impact the flow of youth into the deep end of the youth justice system.

CROSS-CUTTING ELEMENTS:

1. Collaboration — a diverse group of juvenile justice stakeholders, community representatives and youth and families impacted by the system actively engaged in the development, implementation and evaluation of juvenile justice policy and practice.

2. Using Data to Drive Policy and Practice — access to comprehensive deep end data and statistics, capacity to conduct in-depth and complex data analyses, and regular use of data to inform decision making and improve system policies, practices and programs.

3. Achieving Racial and Ethnic Equity — consistent monitoring of all programs and practices for their effect on racial disparities, and concerted action to devise and test solutions aimed at achieving greater equity for all youth.

4. Youth Well-Being — diverting youth from deeper system involvement and connecting youth to services outside the juvenile justice system whenever it is appropriate, and providing youth who remain in the system with interventions likely to yield positive outcomes.

5. Family Engagement — treating families as true partners in the decision-making process, ensuring that they are well-informed and treated as a valuable resource for their children.

6. Defense Advocacy — providing system-involved youth with access to well-trained defense attorneys who zealously advocate on their behalf, help youth and their families navigate the complex legal system while ensuring that young people’s voices are heard.

POINT-IN-TIME ELEMENTS:

1. Narrowing the Pipeline — intentional effort to divert all youth who do not require formal court processing, and an array of diversion options to serve youth effectively and reduce the likelihood they will further penetrate the system.

2. Dispositional Decision Making — where dispositional recommendations are made using objective tools that are supported by system stakeholders and rarely overridden, and that sharply limit the use of confinement.

3. Probation — with clearly defined goals and a practice model that requires probation officers to work with youth (and their families) to identify and implement effective strategies for behavior change, and to hold youth accountable for
From the outset, the Casey Foundation elected to target deep end reform efforts at both the local and state levels. Local efforts build on the work of JDAI sites and enable local leadership teams to identify policies and practices in other phases of the juvenile court process that could limit placements into residential facilities. The Casey Foundation also sought to engage leaders in state government, because unlike detention, juvenile corrections policy is typically overseen by state government rather than localities. In addition to operating or funding corrections facilities, most states set the rules regarding who pays for youth to be incarcerated, which youth are eligible for commitment and how long they must remain in custody.

In the spring of 2012, the Casey Foundation surveyed local JDAI sites nationally to gauge their interest in deep end reform, and in the summer the Foundation convened four regional meetings to inform JDAI sites with at least two years of experience about the deep end reform opportunities and to assess their readiness to pursue such work. In the early autumn, Foundation staff conducted visits with the sites judged to be the most ready to take on the deep end reform work, and ultimately selected six local JDAI sites — Bernalillo County, New Mexico; Jefferson Parish, Louisiana; Lucas County, Ohio; Marion County (Indianapolis), Indiana; St. Louis City, Missouri; and Washoe County (Reno), Nevada — to participate as local pilot sites.
In addition, through a partnership with the Pew Center on the States, Casey also began the process of identifying states to pursue deep end reforms. After conducting background research on 10 potential state targets and site visits in three states, Georgia was selected as the first state. Work began quickly, thanks to the decision by Governor Nathan Deal to appoint a “special council” in May 2012 to consider juvenile justice (and criminal justice) reforms.

**Initial Progress.** Though it is far too soon to measure success, deep end reform efforts in the pilot jurisdictions saw substantial initial progress by the end of 2013. In Georgia, experts at the Pew Center on the States conducted an intensive system assessment in the summer of 2012 to determine the major drivers of commitments and residential placements in the state’s juvenile system. Casey and Pew provided significant assistance to workgroups of the special commission, which released a far-reaching juvenile justice reform plan in December 2012.

The plan was enacted in the spring of 2013 with nearly unanimous votes in both houses of the legislature. The new law prohibits juvenile courts from committing youth to state custody for status offenses (like running away from home) and for misdemeanor offenses except when committed by chronic offenders with at least one prior felony conviction. The reforms also allow the state Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to reduce lengths of stay for youth guilty of several designated felonies that were previously subject to rigid sentencing rules. Finally, the new law requires that all youth entering the juvenile court system receive a standardized risk and needs assessment, and it creates a new $6 million per year grant program providing funding for counties to expand access to evidence-based community programs — provided the counties reduce the number of youth they commit to state custody. Since the law’s passage, Casey has been working with DJJ to develop new risk assessment and structured decision-making tools to limit residential confinement of low-risk youth, and Casey is providing training in counties throughout the state to help local officials identify target populations that might be safely supervised in the community.

![Graph](image-url)
To help determine the most efficient process for supporting local deep end reforms, the Casey Foundation created two separate tracks for participating sites: Jefferson Parish and Marion County will receive intensive ongoing technical assistance from Casey experts, while the remaining four pilot sites (Bernalillo County, New Mexico; Lucas County, Ohio; St. Louis City, Missouri; and Washoe County [Reno], Nevada) will pursue deep end reforms through “self-guided” planning activities. These self-guided sites will rely on tools developed by Casey, but will receive far less on-site direct assistance from Casey staff and consultants. At the end of the process, Casey will assess the relative success of the two cohorts and determine the optimal approach for supporting future deep end sites.

SUSTAINABLY REDUCING DEEP END POPULATIONS WILL REQUIRE STATE AND LOCAL SITES TO TAKE A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO REFORM, MUCH LIKE JDAI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE &amp; LOCAL POLICY CHANGES</th>
<th>STATE &amp; LOCAL PRACTICE CHANGES</th>
<th>STATE &amp; LOCAL ALTERNATIVES TO PLACEMENT</th>
<th>STATE &amp; LOCAL ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies that discourage or restrict unnecessary confinement:</td>
<td>Practices that focus resources on youth at greatest risk:</td>
<td>Program and service alternatives to confinement:</td>
<td>Core organizational capabilities essential to do the work:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibitions on placement for targeted populations</td>
<td>Objective assessment instruments and structured decision-making tools</td>
<td>Non-residential supervision and case management to help youth succeed</td>
<td>Planning and analytical capacities to design and monitor reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal incentives that prioritize community-based and family-focused interventions</td>
<td>Alternative dispositional planning techniques</td>
<td>Evidence-based, family-focused programs</td>
<td>Staff development, training and knowledge management resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositional guidelines that operationalize “least restrictive alternative”</td>
<td>Enhanced defense representation</td>
<td>Limited residential options</td>
<td>Data management to track impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced lengths of stay</td>
<td>Effective aftercare services</td>
<td>Fiscal management to guide reallocation of resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Both cohorts have been deeply engaged in deep end reform planning in 2013. All six sites held local “kick off” meetings, participated in a two-day “fundamentals of deep end reform” training seminar, attended a June 2013 inter-site meeting to share their lessons learned to date and conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses to determine what types of cases are being placed or committed. By the end of 2013, all sites had completed an initial system assessment identifying their reform priorities and establishing a plan of action. Moving forward, the sites will pursue different courses depending upon what they identified as the leading “drivers” of confinement. Key action areas will include “narrowing the pipeline” to minimize the number of youth brought into the system for minor offenses, improving probation practice so that fewer “probation failures” result in confinement, strengthening defense representation, establishing new alternatives to detention and incarceration, and instituting new objective dispositional decision-making approaches.

Other New Activities

In addition to this intensive focus on expanding state capacity and pursuing deep end reforms, the JDAI network has also sharpened its attention to other issues in recent years.

• Promoting Family Engagement. From the very outset of JDAI, the Annie E. Casey Foundation encouraged local sites to engage the families of court-involved youth and involve them in the formulation of release plans. For instance, the JDAI model site in Santa Cruz created videos and brochures to inform parents about the juvenile court process, hired parents whose children had previously been involved in the system to serve as peer mentors for families navigating the court process and initiated a family conferencing model to involve parents and other relatives in formulating plans for youth at risk of being placed in residential facilities. Recently, Casey has intensified its focus on families. It provided support for two high-profile national reports on family engagement — one from a new parent-led organization, Justice for Families, and one by the Campaign for Youth Justice. Casey has made family engagement a high-profile theme at its two most recent national JDAI inter-site conferences, including a parent-led plenary session in 2012. Recently, a number of JDAI sites have expanded their efforts to engage and work with families of court-involved youth. For instance, the Washington, DC’s Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services has hired a full-time parent advocate.

• JDAI for Tribal Youth. While youth confinement rates have declined nationwide for all major ethnic groups over the past decade and a half, the pace of progress has been uneven. As displayed in the chart on page 33, the confinement rate for American Indian youth declined just 25 percent from 1997 to 2011, far less than the reductions for white, African-American, Hispanic and Asian youth. Based on this slow progress, combined with the lack of any JDAI sites located on tribal lands, Casey began reaching out to tribal leaders in 2011 to solicit their interest in pursuing detention reform. Working with the National Indian Child Welfare Association and the Association on American Indian Affairs, the Foundation convened two national meetings to discuss JDAI’s relevance to tribal courts and to tribal youth detained in county facilities. Following these meetings, Casey invited all interested tribes with
detention facilities on their reservations to submit letters expressing interest in applying the JDAI model for tribal youth. Planning took place throughout 2012, and in early 2013 the Foundation announced that the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians will be the nation’s first tribal JDAI site. The federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention agreed to fund the required technical assistance for the project, while the Casey Foundation will offer support to the site itself.


- White: -80.5%
- Black: -37%
- Hispanic: -37.7%
- American Indian: -50.8%
- Asian: -25.4%

**• Reenergizing JDAI in Older Sites.** Another strategic focus in recent years for both the Casey Foundation and local leaders has been to review progress and provide support to older JDAI sites that may have lost focus or momentum — or never achieved significant successes to begin with. In several sites, the Foundation has conducted reassessments to review trends in the use of detention and identify opportunities for new programs and/or policy and practice changes. For instance, the city of Baltimore saw little reduction in detention utilization over its first decade after adopting JDAI in 2000, with average daily population falling just 15 percent. In 2011, an analysis by Casey Foundation staff and local personnel uncovered a number of anomalies: a small number of already adjudicated youth were spending an average of seven weeks in detention, consuming a large share (38 percent) of total detention days; one-fourth of the detention population were youth (many of them low risk) detained for failing in detention alternative programs; and 60 percent of youth detained for new offenses scored as low- or moderate-risk on the detention risk assessment instrument. Based on this analysis, Baltimore’s JDAI team implemented a series of policy and practice changes. As a result, Baltimore’s ADP fell from 114 in the first quarter of 2012 to 68 in the first quarter of 2013. In other sites, local site leaders have been the primary drivers of reinvigorated JDAI efforts. San Francisco, for instance, actually had a higher detention ADP in 2008 (124 youth/day) than it did in 2001 (115 youth/day), when JDAI began. Since then, however, San Francisco’s ADP has fallen to 74, thanks to a variety of changes designed to limit overrides of the detention risk assessment instrument, reduce detention admissions resulting from probation violations and placement failures, and expedite case processing.
Conclusion

Even after 20 years, the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative continues to grow and expand, reaching an ever-larger swath of the U.S. youth population. Participating sites continue to reduce their detention populations and to intensify their work on combating racial and ethnic disparities, improving conditions of confinement, reducing the number of young people locked in detention due to rule violations and expanding and improving their detention alternatives programming. Increasingly, state governments are embracing their roles as catalysts and facilitators of detention reform, building capacity to encourage and support effective replication of the JDAI model and taking it to scale across their states. Meanwhile, JDAI is expanding its focus to the deep end of the juvenile system — working with local jurisdictions and with states to craft a rigorous and replicable methodology for reducing reliance on correctional incarceration.

Even beyond the specific accomplishments of JDAI sites nationwide, and of the JDAI network as a whole, the Annie E. Casey Foundation is gratified by the larger shift that is currently underway in juvenile justice systems throughout the nation. When Casey was launching JDAI in the 1990s, a punitive law-and-order mentality toward adolescent lawbreaking had gripped the nation. Indeed, this reflexive get-tough, adult-time-for-adult-crime thinking ultimately thwarted success in two of the initiative’s five pilot sites.

Today, juvenile justice systems all across the nation are rethinking their approaches. Bolstered by a wave of new evidence showing that adolescent brains are not fully developed, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that underage offenders need and deserve a different and more rehabilitative justice system than adults. States have substantially reduced the number of youth incarcerated in juvenile corrections institutions and placed into other residential facilities. And increasingly, governors and state legislators from both political parties are embracing “smart on crime” reforms aimed at limiting incarceration to the most dangerous cases and investing instead in effective community-based treatment and supervision.

While it is not possible to quantify JDAI’s contribution to this trend, there is no question that JDAI has proven a powerful change agent in the many localities where it operates, and in many states. Not only has JDAI narrowed the pipeline into the deep end of the youth corrections system by increasing the number of youth who remain free pending their adjudication hearings, it has also fostered a fundamental philosophical shift in many system personnel, and it has fostered an acute culture change in many juvenile courts and probation agencies.

One staff member in Clark County, Nevada, recently observed that often when a new reform program is implemented, it fizzles out in two or three years and is replaced by the next new initiative. “Usually that’s what happens and you just wait your time through it. But JDAI didn’t do that,” this staff member
observed. “And when we saw it was going to stick, you had to get on board and probation officers had to get a new philosophy. So that’s probably the biggest thing for us. It stuck and because it stuck we’ve changed everything in our philosophy in how to do this. There was buy-in, there was no straying from it. There was no deviation.”

Speaking to the national JDAI Inter-Site Conference in 2012, the Deputy Director of Juvenile Probation in Harris County, Texas, Tim Broussard, described how JDAI transformed his attitude and that of his colleagues. Prior to JDAI, “We looked upon detention as a good thing for kids,” Broussard explained. “I have detained children because they pissed me off, because they failed to understand the seriousness of what they had done to bring them to us, because they cursed their parents in my presence. We sort of treated detention like it was good for kids. We know much differently now.”
ENDNOTES


12. Ibid.


15. An Examination of the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), supra note 8.

16. Ibid.